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Abstract
In the current discussion about the capacity of Bayesianism in reasoning under uncertainty,
there is a conceptual and notational confusion between the explicit condition and the implicit
condition of a probability evaluation. Consequently, the limitation of Bayesianism is often seriously
underestimated. To represent the uncertainty of a belief system where revision is needed, it is not
enough to assign a probability value to each belief.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, Bayesian networks have achieved great success. It has been applied to
various problems, and taken by more and more people as a normative theory of reasoning,
both for the human mind, and for artificial intelligence systems.
Though the Bayesian approach is indeed a powerful tool for many theoretical and
practical problems, in the current study its limitation is often seriously underestimated,
due to a conceptual and notational confusion. The problem was first addressed in [29], but
it has got little attention, and the confusion continues to spread. This research note provides
a more focused and comprehensive discussion on this issue.
According to Pearl [21], traditional Bayesianism is defined by the following attributes:
• willingness to accept subjective belief as an expedient substitute for raw data,
• reliance on complete (i.e., coherent) probabilistic models of beliefs,
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• adherence to Bayes’ conditionalization as the primary mechanism for updating belief
in light of new information.
When probability theory is applied in a reasoning system, it usually starts by assuming
a proposition space S, which contains all the propositions that the system can represent and
process. S is normally generated from a set of atomic propositions, using logical operators
NOT (¬), AND (∧), and OR (∨). A probability distribution P is defined on S, and for
every proposition x ∈ S, its probability evaluation P(x) is a real number in [0,1].1 The
function P satisfies the following axioms [16]:
• P(x ∨ ¬x) = 1.
• P(x ∨ y) = P(x) + P(y), if y ∈ S and x ∧ y is false.
For any x and y in S, the probability of x under the condition that y is true is a conditional
probability evaluation P(x | y) = P(x ∧ y)/P (y). From it we get Bayes’ Theorem
P(x | y) = P(y | x)P (x)
P (y)
. (1)
Though the above mathematical definitions and results are acknowledged by all people
using probability theory for reasoning, the Bayesian approach interprets them differently.
According to Bayesianism (as defined above), the probability of a proposition h in a system
is the system’s degree of belief on h, according to certain background knowledge K (or
call it experience, data, evidence, and so on).
The system starts with a prior probability distribution P0, determined by background
knowledge K0 at time t0. At time t1, when a piece of new knowledge e is collected, Bayes’
Theorem is applied to change P0 into a posterior probability distribution P1, where the
probability of a proposition h is
P1(h) = P0(h | e) = P0(e | h)P0(h)
P0(e)
. (2)
Now P1 is based on K1, which includes both K0 and e. By repeatedly applying Bayes’
Theorem in this “conditioning” process, the system learns new knowledge, and adjusts its
beliefs accordingly [14,22].
According to the above description, we see that under the Bayesian interpretation, a
probabilistic evaluation P(h) is always “conditional”, in the sense that it is not an objective
property of the proposition h, but a relation between h and background knowledge K . For
this reason, the previous inference rule can be written as
PK1(h) = PK0(h | e) =
PK0(e | h)PK0(h)
PK0(e)
, (3)
1 Sometimes a probability distribution is not defined on a proposition space S , but on a set of events or a set
of possible values of certain random variables. However, since the probability of an event E is the same as the
probability of the proposition “E happens”, and the probability of a random variable X to have value v is the
same as probability of the proposition “X = v”, for the current discussion it is fine to use the proposition space
representation.
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where K0 and K1 are the background knowledge the system has at time t0 and t1,
respectively. In the following, I will call them “implicit conditions” of the corresponding
probability distribution function, because they are conditions of the probability functions,
and they are usually implicitly assumed in the formula.
A common practice is to represent the dependency of a probability to an implicit
condition as a conditional probability, that is, to write Eq. (3) as
P(h | K1) = P(h | e ∧ K0) = P(e | h ∧ K0)P (h | K0)
P (e | K0) . (4)
Such a representation can be found in many publications, for example, [1,14,20,22].
Since in a conditional probability the condition is explicitly represented, in the
following, I will call them “explicit conditions”. The argument this research note makes
is that, in general, it is improper to represent an implicit condition as an explicit condition,
and that their difference shows a serious limitation of Bayesianism, which is related to
several previous debates on related topics.
2. Explicit conditions vs. implicit conditions
Since Bayesian learning is carried out by Eq. (2), the knowledge the system can directly
learn in this way must be represented as an explicit condition e. This means:
(1) It is a (binary) proposition (otherwise it cannot be in S).
(2) It is in S (otherwise its probability P0(e) is undefined).
(3) P0(e) > 0 (otherwise it cannot be used as a denominator).
The first restriction should not be confused with that a random variable X can have
more than two possible values. Though X can have more than two values, the knowledge
“X = vi” is still a binary proposition.
These restrictions are not unknown—for example, a similar list is discussed in [6,21].
Since all learning methods have their restrictions, it is not a surprise that Bayesian
conditioning cannot learning everything. However, here the problem is that the above
restrictions are not applied to the implicit conditions of probability distribution functions:
(1) An implicit condition may include statistical conclusions and subjective probabilistic
estimates, which are not binary propositions.
(2) An implicit condition only needs to be related to S, but not necessarily in S. For
example, “Tweety is a bird and cannot fly” can be part of an implicit condition, even
though S includes only “Birds fly”, and does not include the name “Tweety” at all.
(3) Even if a proposition is assigned a prior probability of zero according to one knowledge
source, it is still possible for the proposition to be assigned a non-zero probability
according to another knowledge source.
Now we can see that only certain types of implicit conditions can be represented as explicit
conditions. It follows that if some knowledge is not available when the prior probability
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is determined, it is impossible to be put into the system through Bayesian conditioning.
We cannot assume that we can always start with a “non-informative” prior probability
distribution, and learn the relevant knowledge when it becomes available.
Therefore, it is wrong to represent an implicit condition as an explicit condition, and the
previous equations (3) and (4) are not equivalent to each other. Though both equations are
correct, they have different meanings.
From a practical point of view, the three restrictions are not trivial, since they mean that
although the background knowledge can be probabilistic-valued, all new knowledge must
be binary-valued; no novel concept and proposition can appear in new knowledge; and if
a proposition is given a probability 1 or 0, such a belief cannot be changed in the future,
no matter what happens. We could build such a system, but unfortunately it would be a far
cry from the everyday reasoning process of a human being.
Some people claim that the Bayesian approach is sufficient for reasoning with
uncertainty, and many people treat Bayes’ Theorem as a generally applicable learning
rule, because explicit conditions and implicit conditions of a probability evaluation
are seldom clearly distinguished in related discussions. Without such a distinction, the
illusion arises that all the knowledge supporting a probability distribution function can be
represented by explicit conditions, and can therefore be learned by the system using Bayes’
conditionalization.
3. Revision vs. updating
Within the Bayesian tradition, there is a way to handle new evidence that is not a binary
proposition. After a prior probability distribution P0 is assigned to a proposition space S,
some new evidence may show that “The probability of proposition e (e ∈ S) should be
changed to p” (i.e., P1(e) = p). In this situation, assuming the conditional probabilities
that with e or ¬e as explicit condition are unchanged (i.e., P1(h | e) = P0(h | e)), we can
update the probability evaluation for every proposition h in S to get a new distribution
function according to Jeffrey’s rule [6,15,17,20]:
P1(h) = P0(h | e) × p + P0(h | ¬e)× (1 − p). (5)
If we interpret “e happens” as “e’s probability should be changed to 1”, then Bayes’
Theorem, when used for learning as in (2), becomes a special case of Jeffrey’s rule, where
p = 1.2
A related method was suggested to process uncertain evidence e, where a “virtual
proposition” v is introduced to represent the new knowledge as “a (unspecified) proposition
v is true, and P0(e | v) = p” [2,20]. Then a new conditional probability distribution can be
calculated (after considering the new knowledge) in the following way:
P1(h) = P0(h | v) = P0(h | e ∧ v) × P0(e | v) + P0(h | ¬e ∧ v) × P0(¬e | v). (6)
2 Jeffrey’s rule can be seen as a special case of “Probability Kinematics” [15], by which P1(h) =∑n
i=1 P0(h | ei )P1(ei ), where
∑n
i=1 P1(ei ) = 1.
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Under the assumption that P0(x | e ∧ v) = P0(x | e) and P0(x | ¬e ∧ v) = P0(x | ¬e),
Eq. (6) can be reduced into (7):
P1(h) = P0(h | v) = P0(h | e) × p + P0(h | ¬e) × (1 − p). (7)
Therefore we end up with Jeffrey’s rule. The only difference is that here the prior
probability is not updated directly, but is instead conditionalized by a virtual condition
(the unspecified proposition v). However, no matter which procedure is followed and how
the process is interpreted, the result is the same [21].
Some other systems process uncertain evidence by providing likelihood ratios of virtual
propositions [13,20]. This method also leads to conditionalization of a virtual condition,
therefore is semantically equivalent to the previous approach [21].
Jeffrey’s rule (and its equivalent forms) avoids the first restriction of Bayes’ Theorem,
that is, the new evidence must be a binary proposition. Also, if conditional probability is
directly defined by de Finetti’s coherent conditional probability (that is, not as P(x | y) =
P(x ∧ y)/P (y)), it is possible to do conditioning on an event which has prior probability 0
[3]. Furthermore, Pearl defines “Neo-Bayesianism” by adding structural information
(i.e., the topological structure of a Bayesian network) into tradition Bayesianism. With
this kind of information, conditional probability can be introduced independent of the
absolute probability values, and, therefore, the above limitations of conditioning is
overcome [21].
Though the above methods are well justified, they only cover a special case. In general,
by “revision” (or “learning”, “belief change”, and so on), I mean the process by which a
system changes the degree of belief (no matter what they are called and defined) of certain
proposition h from B(h) = p1 to B(h) = p2, according to evidence e. By “updating”, in
this paper I mean a special case of the above process where e takes the form of “B(h)
should be p2”, and it is indeed the result of the process, no matter what p1 is.
This distinction between “revision” and “updating” should not be confused with some
other distinctions made in previous discussions. For example, some authors use “revision”
for “correction of wrong beliefs”, and “updating” for “belief change due to changing
world” [9]. In the current discussion, however, the issue is not why a belief change happens,
but whether the new value is exactly what the evidence says.
Another distinction is “revision” vs. “focusing”, as discussed in [10], corresponding
to the modification of generic knowledge and the shifting of reference class according
to the current situation, respectively. Focusing does not really change any belief of the
system. Instead, in this process conditional propositions are used to replace unconditional
propositions (though the conditions may not be explicitly represented). On the other
hand, the revision view of conditioning, as advocated by people working in probability
kinematics [7,15], is about how to change a probability distribution according to
new information. As analyzed previously, conditioning used in this way can only
completely replace the previous probability distribution with a new one (what I call
“updating”), but cannot balance (or take some kind of “average” of) the two (what I call
“revision”).
Though “updating” is a valid operation in uncertain reasoning, it is only a special case
of “revision”, because it does not cover the situation where the result is a compromise
of conflicting beliefs/information/evidence. In certain situations, it is proper to interpret
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belief changes as updating [9], but revision is a more general and important operation.
When there are conflicts among beliefs, it is unusual that one piece of evidence can be
completely suppressed by another piece of evidence, even though it make sense to assume
that new evidence is usually “stronger” than old evidence.
Some authors represent revision as “deriving P(h | e1 ∧ e2) from P(h | e1) and
P(h | e2)” [5]. According to the previous discussion, we can see that this treatment only
considers explicit conditions, while in general we cannot assume that conflict beliefs
always come under the same implicit condition.
Concretely speaking, revision of probability happens when the system’s current belief
on h is PK0(h), the new knowledge is PK ′0(h), and the result is PK1(h), where K1
summarized the knowledge in K0 and K ′0. We cannot do it in the Bayesian approach,
because PK ′0(h) contains information that cannot be derived from PK0 , nor can the
operation be treated as updating, where PK0(e) is simply replaced by PK ′0(h). Intuitively,
to carry out the revision operation, we need more information about K0 and K ′0, and this
information is not in the probability distribution function PK0 .
Therefore, even if Jeffrey’s rule is used to replace Bayes’ Theorem and structure
information is added into the picture, the system still does not have a general way to revise
its implicit conditions (i.e., background knowledge behind the probability distribution
function). If we want to apply a Bayesian network to a practical domain, one of the
following requirements must be satisfied:
(1) The implicit condition of the initial probability distribution, that is, the domain
knowledge used to determine the distribution initially, can be assumed to be immune
from future modifications; or
(2) All modifications of the implicit condition can be treated as updating, in the sense that
when new knowledge conflict with old knowledge, the latter is completely abandoned.
From artificial intelligence’s point of view, such domains are exceptions, rather than
general situations. In most cases, we can guarantee neither that all initial knowledge is
unchangeable, nor that later acquired knowledge always completely suppresses earlier
acquired knowledge. Usually, revision is a compromise, as addressed in the discussions
on belief change [26] and multiple source information fusion [8].3
Some people may think that whenever the above situation happens, we can always go
back to the very beginning, to redefine the proposition space and the probability function
on it, according to all currently available information. Of course this can be done, but it
is not done by the Bayesian learning mechanism of the system itself, but by the designers
using something else. Such a redesign shows the limitation, not the strength, of Bayesian
learning.
3 Information fusion also includes many other issues, such as to detect whether the information sources are
using the same evidence. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
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4. Ignorance and sensitivitySince the probability distribution function P is defined on S according to implicit
condition K , it provides a summary of the available knowledge of the system about
propositions in S, but the function says little about K itself. Consequently, the system
has no general way to revise and extend K . The Bayesian approach has no general way
to represent and handle the uncertainty within the background knowledge and the prior
probability function. This is a serious limitation of Bayesianism, both in theory and in
application.
Though the distinction between explicit and implicit conditions is rarely made, the
above conclusion, that is, Bayesianism has limitations in representing and processing
uncertainty, is not new at all. From different considerations, many people reached the same
conclusion, that is, to use a probability distribution function alone to represent uncertainty
is not enough, because it fails to show the ignorance, or uncertainty about the function
itself.
Several alternative approaches are proposed to solve this problem, including the
following:
• probability interval, where the probability value is not specified as a point, but as an
interval, and the width of the interval indicates the ignorance of the system [12,18],
• higher-order probability, where a second probability value is introduced to specify the
accuracy of the “first-order” probability evaluation [18,19],
• imprecise probability, where upper and lower probability values are used to replace
precise probability values [27,28],
• Dempster–Shafer theory, where a belief function and a plausibility function are used
to represent uncertainty, and a evidence combination rule is used to reduce ignorance
[4,23],
• confidence measurement, where a frequency value and a confidence value are used to
represent uncertainty, and the latter also indicates ignorance [29,32].
Though these approaches are technically different, they can all (more or less) be seen as
attempts of extending the Bayesian approach by using more than one value to represent the
uncertainty of a statement, and therefore indicates the ignorance of the system.4
To discuss these approaches is beyond the scope of this research note.5 In the following
I only analyze the response from the Bayesian school against these challenges.
To argue against the opinion that “more than one number is needed to represent
uncertainty”, Cheeseman [1] claimed that a point value and a density function will give
the same result in decision making, which I agree to certain extent. However, I believe
that he was wrong by saying that standard deviation can be used to capture “the change of
4 A related work is possibility theory, which is not an attempt to extend probability theory, but also use two
values to represent ignorance [11]. There are other competitors of Bayesianism, such as fuzzy logic [33] and
Spohn’s kappa calculus [25], as well as the approaches without numerical measurement of uncertainty, but they
are irrelevant to the current discussion.
5 Such discussions can be found in [30–32].
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expectations” (or revision, as defined in this paper). If we test a proposition n times, and the
results are the same, then the standard deviation of the results is 0, that is, independent of n.
But our confidence about “the result will remain the same” will obviously increase with n.
Actually, what the standard deviation measures is the variations among the samples, but
what needed in revision, intuitively speaking, has more to do with the amount of the
samples.
Pearl said the uncertainty in the assessment of P0(e) is measured by the (narrowness of
the) distribution of P0(e | c) as c ranges over all combinations of contingencies, and each
combination c is weighted by its current belief P0(c) [20]. A similar approach is in [24],
where ignorance is treated as sensitivity.
I agree with them that ignorance is the lack of confidence, and confidence can be
measured by how much a degree of belief can be modified by possible future evidence
(in this sense, it is different from what measured by the “confidence interval” in statistics)
[32]. However, in their definition, they still assume that all relevant future evidence causing
a belief change can be represented as an explicit condition, and can be processed through
conditioning. As a result, their measurement of ignorance (or confidence) cannot captures
the ignorance about implicit conditions.
No matter whether other approaches can solve the problem, as far as the “ignorance”
to be represented is about an implicit condition, it cannot be handled properly by
Bayesianism. For a specific domain, if revision is a crucial operation for the solving of the
practical problems, the Bayesian approach cannot be used, and other approaches should be
considered.
5. Conclusion
In this short research note I do not intend to evaluate all aspects of Bayesianism, not even
all of its limitations.6 Instead, I try to clarify the interpretation of conditional probability
by distinguish two types of conditions, because this distinction is in the center of several
previous debates, and the confusion can be found in many influential publications.
According to the above analysis, what the Bayesian approach can do is:
• Given some values in a probability distribution, to calculate some other values in the
same distribution, as shown in Eq. (1).
• Given some values in a new probability distribution, to update a previous probability
distribution accordingly, as shown in Eqs. (2) and (5).
What it cannot do is:
• To combine conflicting beliefs that are based on different implicit conditions, such as
PK0(h) and PK ′0(h).
6 There are other issues, such as the requirement of a coherent prior probability function and the computational
expense of global updating.
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• To carry out inference when the premises are based different implicit conditions, such
as PK0(h | e) and PK ′0(e).
For the last two cases, we need additional information about the implicit conditions
involved (to merely attach a probability value to each belief is not enough), as well as
inference rules that use this kind of information.
When a reasoning system has insufficient knowledge and resources (with respect to
the tasks assigned to it), it cannot assume that the initial background knowledge does
not need revise, nor that all revisions can be treated as complete updating of probability
distribution function. Therefore, the above limitation means that the Bayesian approach is
not a normative theory of reasoning in this situation, and we need something else [32].
Though similar conclusions were proposed by other people before, the discussion has
been messed up by the confusion between explicit conditions and implicit conditions of
probability evaluations. This confusion is both conceptual and notational, and it causes a
serious underestimation about the limitation of Bayesianism. To clearly distinguish these
two types of conditions, as well as to clearly distinguish different operations like revision
and updating, will not only help us to understand the capacity of the Bayesian approach,
but will also help us to design and analyze alternative approaches for reasoning under
uncertainty.
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